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Abstract 
The Western Balkans have historically been a poor area of Europe. The 
total population of the Western Balkans is 24.7 million. Ethnic differences of 
long standing have led to conflicts and to political and economic instability. 
Poverty and instability have combined to produce a vicious circle of institu-
tional backwardness.  Recent conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo have aggravated an already adverse economic situation. GDP in 
1999 was substantially lower than that in 1989.  The EU plans to enter into 
contractual relationships with all the Western Balkans in the form of Stabili-
zation and Association Agreements (SAAs). The pacts are aimed at helping to 
establish economic and political stability, to implement institutional reforms, 
to practice regional free trade and cooperation and to privatize the econo-
mies of Western Balkans. These are also the presumed goals of the Western 
Balkans. 
This study focuses on a review of the progress made by the Western Bal-
kans toward meeting the above stated challenges. A main conclusion is that 
the attainment of these goals has been asymmetrical for economic, political 
and institutional reasons. 
1. Introduction 
The Western Balkans have historically been a poor area of Europe. The 
total population of the Western Balkans is 24.7 million. Ethnic differences of 
long standing have led to conflicts and to political and economic instability. 
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Poverty and instability have combined to produce a vicious circle of institu-
tional backwardness.  Recent conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo have aggravated an already adverse economic situation. GDP in 
1999 was substantially lower than that in 1989
1
. The Western Balkans, which 
with the exception of Albania resulted from the break up of the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia i.e., Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM) and Yugoslavia.  The Western Balkans are 
designated by the European Union (EU) as subject to its regional policy.  The 
premise of this policy is that these countries can not expect closer relations 
with the EU than they have among themselves.  In other words, the regional 
policy represents a trade off between local conflicts and EU integration.  The 
EU plans to enter into contractual relationships with all the Western Balkans 
in the form of Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs). The pacts 
are aimed at helping to establish economic and political stability, to imple-
ment institutional reforms, to practice regional free trade and cooperation and 
to privatize the economies of Western Balkans. These are also the presumed 
goals of the Western Balkans. The SAAS also offer financial assistance to 
the Western Balkans to help them attain these goals. 
This study focuses on a review of the progress made by the Western Bal-
kans toward meeting the above stated challenges. Following a general dis-
cussion of the challenges, brief country profiles examining some of the re-
sults of the changes made by the Western Balkans are presented. Finally an 
assessment of these changes in the form of a summary and conclusions is 
offered. 
2. Overview of challenges 
As mentioned previously the Western Balkans especially in the last sev-
eral years have been uniquely affected by wars and conflict. Armed aggres-
sion in Croatia, a 43 month war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s 
and the war in Kosovo in 1999 have all generated political turmoil and eco-
nomic devastation and instability. The almost one-half million Kosovo refu-
gees to Albania imposed a most severe burden on Albania, one of the poorest 
countries of the Balkans. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina almost four 
years after the fighting ended, relative tranquility continues to depend on 
32,000 NATO personnel.  
Since the end of World War II the Western Balkans were governed by a 
command-driven system whereby all the sectors of their economies were 
nationalized.  Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall they have begun a 
process of privatization.  A transition to a market economy is often a pro-
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tracted process. It requires among other things, the privatization of the state 
owned enterprises, establishment and protection of property rights, reforms 
in the banking systems and in the money and capital markets and a change in 
the people’s attitude and ethic. It must be added that in the Western Balkans 
weak institutions, public and private, and the absence of the rule of law, con-
tribute to high risks in conducting business and encourage corruption and 
black markets. These types of characteristics are counterproductive to effi-
ciently functioning markets. Moreover, economies which move from com-
mand type of systems to markets may experience other costs such as infla-
tion, unemployment and economic insecurity. The experiences of Russia, 
East Germany, Eastern Europe and Baltic countries underscore the complex-
ity of the transition process (Kondonassis 1994; Brown 1993; Elliot 1993; 
Ostas 1992). 
Given the ultimate interest of these countries to join the European Union 
(EU), it is instructive to note the findings of a Task Force Report of the East 
West Institute that the barriers to trade and investment both within the region 
and with the rest of Europe are substantial
2
. These barriers include high tar-
iffs, cumbersome trade regulations and insufficient legal protection of in-
vestments.  Trade barriers with the outside world are also significant espe-
cially with the EU, which is a major outlet of the region’s products.  The 
wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo and the sanctions im-
posed on Yugoslavia have exacerbated the negatives on regional integration. 
Nevertheless, liberalization of trade within the Western Balkans and with the 
rest of Europe is an important condition for regional cooperation and for an 
expansion of the size of the market of the individual Western Balkans. 
The EU in 1997 initially developed its regional approach which outlined 
potential political and economic relations with the region. These relations 
were further clarified by the development in 1999 of an overall cooperative 
arrangement with the countries of the region, the Stabilization and Associa-
tion Process. This process includes preferential trade concessions and an as-
sistance program tailor-made to take under account each country’s asymme-
tries and to allow them to progress at their own pace and with appropriate 
reforms aimed toward eventual EU accession. These agreements took the 
form of the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs). In 2000, the 
EU granted duty free access to most Western Balkans’ exports. A gradual 
lowering of tariffs by the Western Balkans and an eventual free trade area 
between the EU and each country of the region is visualized. 
The EU has been a large donor in the period of 1991-2001. The EU 
budget has provided €6 billion to the Western Balkans. In addition, individ-
ual EU member state’s contributions have brought the total aid for the period 
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to more that €10 billion
3
. The Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 and the aid it 
provided has also supported the reconstruction effort of BiH. 
EU’s economic assistance to the Western Balkans has evolved to the de-
velopment of the CARDS Regulation (Community Assistance for Recon-
struction, Development and Stabilization).  CARDS aid is provided primarily 
in the form of grants and is aimed at institutional changes, public administra-
tion reforms and investments including infrastructure investments. It is 
guided by strategy papers formulated by the countries of the region. The 
amount specified for 2000-2006 is €4.65 billion
4
. Some of the CARDS assis-
tance covers macro-financial assistance which is made conditionally on the 
implementation of economic reforms. In addition, the EU provides non-
conditional humanitarian assistance. International Financial Institutions, e.g., 
World Bank, IMF and EU member countries, are also involved in extending 
financial assistance to the region.  
To provide some specific information on the performance of the Western 
Balkans with special reference to stabilization and privatization efforts as 
well as to the liberalization of trade, institutional reforms and the inflows of 
financial resources to the area, brief indicative profiles of these countries are 
given below. To the extent that the data used are for five years only, any 
conclusions reached must be viewed as tentative. 
3. Profiles of Western Balkans
5
 
 
Albania 
Until the early 1990s Albania had one of the most centralized and repres-
sive regimes in the world. The collapse of communism in Albania brought 
about a chaotic situation which began to be corrected with a democratically-
elected government in March 1992. The government launched an ambitious 
program of economic reform including privatization, monetary reforms and 
trade liberalization. Subsequently, the Albanian economy experienced posi-
tive economic changes but many needed institutional reforms were not im-
plemented, e.g. judicial reforms, fight against corruption. In 1997 Albania 
experienced another crisis resulting from the collapse of investment schemes 
which led to civil unrest and political strife; but beginning in October 1998 
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with the election of Pandeli Majko as Prime Minister a new optimism for 
long term stability has arisen. 
Growth rates of 8%, 7.3%, 7.8%, 6.5% and 5% in 1998, 1999, 2000, 
2001 and 2002 respectively as well as relatively low inflation rates have 
characterized Albania as shown in Tables 1 & 2. The euro has been used as 
an external anchor. Unemployment was one of the lowest among the Western 
Balkans, it ranged from 18% in 1999 to 14.2% in 2002. It declined to 14.2% 
in 2002 because of growth and tightening of the grey economy. The fiscal 
deficit as a percent of GDP decreased from 11.4% in 1999 to 8% in 2002
6
. 
This is attributable to an increase on tax revenues and an increase in privati-
zation receipts which helped reduce domestic borrowing. A restrictive mone-
tary policy was a major force in keeping prices relatively stable as shown in 
Table 1 and 2. 
Albania made progress toward trade liberalization. In 2000, it became a 
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The EU granted Albania a 
duty free access to most Albanian exports with some conditions for textile 
and agricultural products. 
In 2000 and 2001, Albania was successful in privatization and recon-
struction particularly in the telecommunication and power sectors but also in 
the banking sector. For example, in July 2000 the mobile phone company 
AMC was sold for €93 million to foreign investors and in January 2001, fol-
lowing an international tender, the second mobile phone company was sold 
to a consortium of British and Greek Companies
7
. As a result of Albania’s 
membership in the IMF and the World Bank in 1991, Albania has received 
financial assistance from both organizations. Twenty two reconstruction pro-
jects with the World Bank for a total of $282 million are in the process of 
being implemented
8
. Negotiations for a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement between Albania and the EU commenced in late 2002. The fol-
lowing priorities are identified for Albania for financing under CARDS for 
the period 2001-2004: justice administration, economic and social develop-
ment and democratic stabilization. CARDS assistance is € 181.4 million for 
the period of 2001-2004. Foreign direct investments to Albania increased 
from €40 million in 1998 to €167 million in 2002
9
. 
A survey of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and 
of the World Bank
10
 points out that more than 36% of firms in Albania are 
bribing Albanian officials. Low salaries and lack of administrative control 
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seem to favor corruption. The fight against corruption and organized crime 
remains a major challenge in Albania. 
Bosnia & Herzegovina (BIH) 
Subsequent to the Dayton Agreement in 1995 Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) 
has been challenged to move from war to peace and from socialism to a mar-
ket economy. The first objective appears to have been attained under the in-
fluence of aid of about €5 billion, the power of the High Representative and 
35,000 of NATO personnel. The second is not yet in sight.  
The political uncertainty resulting from the election of November 2000 
has had deleterious effects on the growth rate and on other economic aspects. 
The GDP growth rate declined from 9.9% in 1998 to 2.5% in 2002
11
. Agri-
cultural production due to droughts experienced a major decline. Unem-
ployment as a percent of labor force has ranged from 37.4% 1998 to 41% in 
2002. 
The prevailing political uncertainties have delayed negotiations with the 
EU concerning the possible signing of a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement. Also, the lack of political consensus among the ruling parties 
create the presumption of a continued international intervention in BiH. 
A weak fiscal situation continues to pose continuing macroeconomic 
problems. The government budget deficit as a percent of GDP was 20.1% 
and 11.6% in 1998 and 2002 respectively while the current account deficit as 
a percent of GDP was 20.9% in 1998 and 21.3% in 2002
12
. Imports from 
BiH were given tariff free entry to the EU in 2000. Strict adherence to the 
rules of the currency board arrangement which was established in 1997 
helped keep inflation at moderate rates, i.e., 1.9%, 1.7% and 1.5% in 2000, 
2001 and 2002 respectively. 
Results in privatization have been uneven. While a number of small-size 
enterprises have been privatized, the privatization of large-scale enterprises 
has met with difficulties and lack of success. Privatization of banks is tar-
geted for the end of 2002
13
. Foreign capital in the banking sector is signifi-
cant. In 2001, the World Bank provided assistance of $140 million aimed at 
facilitating reforms and privatization. Under the CARDS arrangement about 
€100 million was granted to BiH for reforms in 2001
14
. 
Corruption is widespread in BiH. It takes various forms including brib-
ery, sale of smuggled goods and selective tax assessments. It is estimated by 
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the World Bank that 22% of business firms are involved in bribing govern-
ment officials. 
Croatia 
In 2000 Croatia moved to establish integration and contractual relation-
ships with the EU. Croatia is the most developed country of the Western 
Balkans. Its per capita GDP was above €5000 in 2001. It became a sovereign 
nation in 1991. However, armed conflicts delayed its independence. 
Croatia’s GDP increased by 2.5% in 1998 and by 4% in 2002. Unem-
ployment as a percent of the labor force has ranged from 11.4% in 1998 to 
14.5% in 2002. The inflation rate stood at 5.4% in 1998 and 3.0% in 2002. 
Croatia’s Central Bank considers price stability the main objective of mone-
tary policy. It uses the exchange rate as nominal anchor. A 4% target rate for 
inflation under influences such as a stable exchange rate, low wages and in-
creased productivity seems attainable. The end of Kosovo crisis had a favor-
able impact on Croatia’s current account balance of payments. It went from a 
6.7% of GDP deficit in 1998 to a deficit of 3.6% in 2002. The budget deficit 
under a stand-by framework with the IMF was reduced from 7.4% of GDP in 
1999 to 4.3% of GDP in 2002. Because of the economy’s openness and the 
resulting foreign competition, Croatia’s unemployment rate has been rather 
high at 15.8% and 14.5% in 2001 and 2002 respectively
15
. 
Croatia joined the WTO in 2002. It also signed a Stabilization and Asso-
ciation Agreement with EU in 2001. Privatization has continued with some 
success. For instance, privatization of banks is almost complete but privatiza-
tion of large firms is slow. Foreign owned banks account for 90% of total 
bank assets in Croatia. The private sector as a share of GDP was 60% in 
2001
16
. The development of capital markets has not made any serious pro-
gress. Reforms in the areas of education, health and the judicial system have 
experienced lags.  
Croatia joined the IMF in 1992 and the World Bank in 1993. Since 1993 
$972 million has been allocated by the World Bank for 19 projects
17
. Croatia 
also joined the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
in 1993. In 2000 a commitment by the bank was made in the amount of €688 
million for support of the private sector
18
. CARDS allocations to Croatia 
were €60 million and €59 million in 2001 and 2002 respectively with pri-
mary focus democratic stabilization, social development and justice.  
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Croatia has signed Free Trade Agreements covering 27 countries includ-
ing other Western Balkans. 55% of Croatia’s total trade is with the EU. For-
eign direct investments increased from €746 million in 1998 to €1171 mil-
lion in 2002
19
, clearly the largest among the Western Balkans. 
Corruption, although at a smaller scale than in the other Western Bal-
kans, it is still a problem in Croatia. Institutional reforms including that of 
the police and of the judicial systems are needed. The World Bank estimates 
that 13% of business firms bribe government officials in Croatia. 
4. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY): Serbia and Montenegro 
The FRY comprises of Serbia and Montenegro. During the period of 
1990-1999, wars and international isolation characterized the FRY. The an-
nual growth in 1999 was a negative of -15.5%. Political changes in Yugosla-
via in 2000 including the removal from power of Milosevic made it possible 
for international contacts to be established once again and for Yugoslavia to 
become eligible to benefit from EU aid programs. In 2000, 2001 and 2002 
GDP growth in Serbia was 6.7%, 5.5% and 4% respectively. Still per capita 
GDP in 2000 was about 45% of the 1989 level
20
. Urgent needs of the popula-
tion were met by the international community which came to the rescue. Un-
employment was 25% and 29% in 1998 and 2002 respectively and inflation 
(end of period) in FRY-Serbia was 113% in 2000
21
. Stabilization and struc-
tural reforms began in 2001 with a reduction of inflation to 39% and 15% in 
2001 and 2002. A monetary policy aimed toward price stability and comple-
mented by a moderate wages policy has helped to bring prices down in 2001 
and 2002. The government budget deficits were at 1.4% and 5% of GDP in 
2001 and 2002 and the current account deficits at 10.9% and 11.7% of GDP 
in 2001 and 2002.  
Tax reform in the FRY with the objective of lowering taxes, broadening 
the tax base, reducing unwarranted exemptions and combating corruption 
was implemented in 2001 and 2002. Progress was also made in cleaning-up 
of the banking system. In both Serbia in 2003 and in Montenegro in 2002, a 
treasury system was established. Expenditure control is expected to ensue. 
In 2001, a trade liberalization was passed by the Serbian Parliament to 
reduce quantitative restrictions and custom tariffs. In 2001 the FRY began 
negotiations for Free Trade Agreements with countries of Southeast and 
Eastern Europe. Montenegro also reduced trade restrictions which are lower 
than Serbia’s. On March 14, 2002 the so called Belgrade Agreement was 
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signed between Serbia and Montenegro. The agreement provided for joint 
political functions and institutions and for a common market for a free flow 
of people, capital, goods and services. Concerning privatization, a legal 
framework was established in 2001 which anticipates eventual privatization 
for about 150 enterprises. In 2001 and 2002, restructuring of public admini-
stration is on the agenda. Three large cement companies and another six en-
terprises were sold in 2002.  In Serbia the process of privatization through 
tenders and auctions has gained momentum in 2002. Total receipts from pri-
vatization in the first 10 months of 2002 amounted to €270 million. Eight 
banks are now under liquidation. In Montenegro privatization which started 
in 1991 for 191 enterprises was scheduled for completion in 2001. In addi-
tion, 53 companies are on the agenda for sale beginning in 2003. In 1998 
Montenegro embarked on economic reforms and stabilization measures and 
obtained defacto autonomy over monetary, trade policy and customs
22
. 
The FRY resumed its membership to the IMF in 2000 and became a 
member of the EBRD and World Bank in 2001. The EU under CARDS 
granted FRY €630 million in 2000-2002 for public administration and trans-
port reforms and € 345 million for economic reforms. A step anticipated in 
the foreseeable future is a feasibility study concerning a possible Stabiliza-
tion and Association Agreement between the EU and the FRY. 
Foreign direct investments to the FRY were € 105 million and €570 mil-
lion in 1998 and 2002 respectively
23
. According to the World Bank bribery 
of public officials runs about 16% in FRY. 
5. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Kosovo 
Kosovo is part of the Republic of Serbia. In 1999 it came under a special 
mandate of the UN Mission in Kosovo according to the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244. As a result of the conflict in 1999, the infrastructure and 
agricultural and industrial production in Kosovo experienced great damage. 
Estimates suggest that per capita GDP was €800 in 2000. Following the con-
flict, economic activity in Kosovo has experienced substantial improvement. 
Agricultural production reached the pre-conflict level in 2001. Construction 
activity and infrastructure building are on the rise largely induced by interna-
tional assistance. 
Inflation is estimated to be in the range of 11.3% and 6.5% in 2001 and 
2002 respectively. Efforts are made to improve the budgetary situation as 
well as the banking system. Unemployment may be as high as 50%. Kosovo 
has not implemented its own monetary policy because it used the DM as its 
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currency and now uses the Euro. The Kosovo Central Budget 2002 estab-
lished the Central Fiscal Authority which will have budget supervisory role. 
Progress toward privatization appears to be slow. The establishment of the 
Kosovo Trust Agency in July 2002 is expected to improve transparency and 
accountability of enterprises and hence promote privatization. Twenty-seven 
socially owned enterprises are targeted for privatization in 2002. Kosovo is 
not a member of the IMF and the World Bank. However, both organizations 
have given technical assistance to Kosovo. CARDS has pledged €315.5 mil-
lion to Kosovo in 2001
24
. Foreign direct investments amounted to €5 million 
in 2001 and €10 million in 2002
25
. Kosovo’s requirements for capital in-
vestments are high but given the prevailing uncertainties the prospects for 
commercial lending are not immediately promising. 
6. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM) 
FYRoM is the only former Republic of the Former Republic of Yugosla-
via to become independent peacefully in 1991. Since independence, democ-
ratic elections have been held and a number of reforms were introduced. Re-
lations with its neighbors have improved including with Greece and the EU.  
GDP grew by 4.6% in 2000 but in 2001 declined by 4.1% largely as a re-
sult of the ethnic crisis in the spring. Unemployment was about 32% in 2000 
and was a high 30.5% in both 2001 and 2002
26
. The small  decline may have 
been the result of increased recruitment to service in the military during the 
ethnic crisis. In 2000 the economy had a 2.5% of GDP budgetary surplus but 
a deficit of 6% and 4.7% of GDP in 2001 and 2002 respectively. As a result 
of a decline in security related expenditures the budget deficit decreased in 
2002 as compared to 2001. Inflation was 6.1% in 2000 and it declined to 
3.7% and 2.5% in 2001 and 2002 respectively. In 1998 and 1999 the FYRoM 
did well in the areas of growth, inflation and budget deficits
27
. The National 
Bank carries out monetary policy and through changes in interest rates and 
reserve requirements has been able to maintain relative price stability in the 
2000-2002 period. The current account deficit was 3.1%, 10.8% and 9.7% of 
GDP in 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively. A large part of exports, more than 
40% of total exports, went to the EU in 2000
28
. 
The FYRoM strengthened its relations, economic and political, with the 
EU. It signed with the EU the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 
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2000. It will establish a free trade area with the EU within 10 years. FYRoM 
also liberalized trade with other countries including other Western Balkans. 
It was anticipated that the FYRoM might become a member of the WTO in 
2002. It is argued that the privatization process has met with considerable 
success in FYRoM. By the end of 2000, 1616 enterprises were privatized. 
These companies have 352,000 employees or about 65% of total country 
employment
29
. However, it should be pointed out that the major successes 
have been with small size firms with about 95% of small and medium size 
firms privatized. Privatization of large firms remains a problem. The so 
called Action Plan has identified 40 companies which need to be restruc-
tured, privatized or liquidated. The banking system, on the other hand, is al-
most completely privatized. About 84% of total bank capital is private
30
. 
Both the IMF and the World Bank have extended financial assistance to 
FYRoM for financial and structural reforms. In 2002 various foreign donors 
including the European Commission and the World Bank pledged €172.6 
million. CARDS committed €56 million in 2001 and €42 million in 2002. 
The focus of these funds has been development, democratic reform and the 
rule of law and justice. Foreign direct investment varied from €150 million in 
1998 to €190 million, €478 million and €76 million in 2000, 2001 and 2002 
respectively
31
. Because of the prevailing corruption, in April 2002 an Anti-
Corruption Law was approved leading to the establishment of an Anti-
Corruption Commission accountable to the Parliament. The World Bank es-
timate of bribery of government officials in FYRoM is 23%. 
7. An assessment of changes: a summary & conclusions 
 
Summary 
BiH has experienced continuing political uncertainties and a high unem-
ployment rate of 40%. It has however been able to reduce inflation to reason-
able levels due to the currency board arrangement in 1997. FRY-Serbia, be-
cause of wars suffered considerable devastation during the 1990-1999 period 
and had the highest inflation rate, among the Western Balkans, of 113% in 
2000. Kosovo also experienced substantial damage as a result of the 1999 
conflict. Following the conflict, it embarked on a program of reconstruction 
and development. It’s position, however, appears to be tenuous. The FRY 
following the political changes in 2000 and the removal from power of Mil-
osevic has reestablished international contacts and became eligible for exter-
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nal financial assistance. A number of stabilization and structural reforms 
have been implemented by both Serbia and Montenegro which have helped 
reduce inflation to 15% in 2002 and produced satisfactory growth rates. 
Some measures to privatize their economies and liberalize their trade were 
also taken. However, at this point, it is difficult to say how things will evolve 
with regard to Kosovo, FRY and especially BiH. The level of political uncer-
tainty continues to be high in these countries. 
On the other hand, the country profiles indicate that Albania and Croatia 
under a relatively stable political climate are on a positive path toward eco-
nomic progress. Their unemployment levels although double digit are the 
lowest among the Western Balkans, their growth rates are reasonable and 
their inflation low. The EU has recognized the efforts of Croatia in the areas 
of growth and inflation by signing with it a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement in 2001. The other Stabilization and Association Agreement of 
the EU was signed with the FYRoM in 2000. The FYRoM, because of the 
ethnic crisis in the spring of 2001 experienced negative growth in 2001, but it 
is anticipated that it will be able to resume positive growth and extend its 
privatization horizons just as it did in 1998 and 1999
32
. Persistently high un-
employment however has been a problem for FYRoM. 
Western Balkans in general seem to have been able to privatize small 
firms easier than large firms whose privatization continues to be slow. It may 
be argued that the scale of the economy and historical opportunities and cir-
cumstances determine the effectiveness of the transition process. Neverthe-
less, positive accomplishments in privatization by Albania, Croatia and FY-
RoM need to be recognized. As discussed above, in 2001 Croatia’s private 
sector contributed 60% of GDP and 90% of total bank assets were foreign 
owned. In Albania privatization has been successful in the telecommunica-
tions, power and banking sectors. In 2000, 1616 enterprises in FYRoM were 
privatized and they employed 65% of total country employment. 
Albania and Croatia joined the WTO in 2000 and FYRoM is anticipated 
to join soon. All three have made progress in the liberalization on their trade. 
Trade liberalization within and without the region, free access of Western 
Balkans exports to the EU and eventual creation of free trade areas are major 
emphases of the SAAs which the FYRoM and Croatia have signed with the 
EU. As observed in the profiles of the Western Balkans a number of them 
have free access of large portions of their exports to the EU. In addition, 
Croatia has signed Free Trade Agreements with 27 countries including West-
ern Balkans. To the extent that Western Balkans visualize accession to the 
EU, perhaps on the distant future, a number of issues concerning enlarge-
ment are relevant. When less developed countries try to integrate and com-
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pete in markets of more developed countries serious consideration must be 
given to a number of issues including the existence of disparities in produc-
tivity and income, market orientation, levels of technology, quality of human 
capital, social and political institutions and infrastructure. Given these issues, 
the Western Balkans are faced with a major challenge if they are to become 
serious candidates for some form of integration with the EU in the future. 
As mentioned before, financial and technical assistance for economic de-
velopment, for restructuring and reforms in the Western Balkans has come 
from various sources. Foreign economic assistance to the Western Balkans 
was €3300 million and €3447 million in 2001 and 2002 respectively
33
. 
Given the multiplicity of sources of support to the Western Balkans, it 
appears that coordination of the support effort is desirable. There is some 
question whether policy has been coordinated in the past. Carl Bildlt, UN 
Representative to the Balkans argues that it is less a question of too many 
cooks spoiling the broth and more that we do not have a recipe
34
. As a result 
of these concerns, the European Commission and the World Bank are cur-
rently involved in a joint enterprise in the coordination of economic assis-
tance to the Western Balkans. Another consideration is that for aid to be ef-
fective requires the active participation and involvement of the local people. 
Without it, development becomes problematical.  
Moreover, because of the asymmetries in the economic and institutional 
character of the Western Balkans financial assistance policies are likely to be 
more effective if they are tailor-made to the resource endowment and the 
institutional framework of the individual countries. The EU’s SAAs take 
account of this need and their cooperation with the Western Balkans is on 
economic and non-economic fronts.  
The importance of the institutional framework in the process of devel-
opment is well understood. Weak institutions, e.g., political instability, cor-
ruption, clearly undermine the process of development. Development 
economists subscribe to the center-periphery thesis as an explanation of why 
foreign capital moves away from the periphery and gravitates toward the 
center where a stable institutional framework and other externalities usually 
exist. A review of foreign direct investments in the Western Balkans from 
1998 to 2002 shows that they were anemic in 1998 but experienced gradual 
improvement. FDIs were €1125 million and €2253 million in 1998 and 2002 
respectively
35
.  This increase seems to coincide with the improvement in sta-
bility conditions and other changes in privatization and liberalization among 
some of the Western Balkans. 
                                                        
33
 See Table 3 
34
 Balkans Reconstruction Observatory, Balkan Eye, Has Anyone Seen Our Policy? 
35
 Table 4 
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The most developed country of the group, Croatia, attracted about 50% 
of the total foreign direct investments. Kosovo received minimum foreign 
direct investments
36
. Foreign direct investments may be viewed as a vote of 
confidence that foreign businesses may give to a given country’s economic, 
political and social environment. The opportunity for profit in a stable and 
safe institutional framework is an important consideration on deciding 
whether to invest in a given country. 
8. Conclusions 
It can be concluded that the attainment of the goals of stabilization, pri-
vatization and liberalization of trade by the different Western Balkans coun-
tries has been asymmetrical and so has been the success of those countries to 
attract direct foreign investments.  
The reviews of the performance of the Western Balkans suggest that the 
weakest links in the Western Balkans have been wars and the associated po-
litical turmoil that has characterized them. Once reasonable tranquility was 
established economic progress became possible in some of the cases re-
viewed. We have also seen that political stability was complemented by 
lower inflation and institutional changes such as the privatization of small 
and medium enterprises, trade liberalization and some banking reforms. 
These mostly positive steps will serve these countries well if they are 
matched by institution building and followed with reforms in the fight 
against corruption, improvement in the judicial systems, putting the financial 
systems on a sound basis, completion of the privatization process and build-
ing an efficient infrastructure system. 
It has also been shown that the role of EU in encouraging and supporting 
institutional changes in the Western Balkans has been of critical importance. 
The SAAs and CARDS initiatives represent major commitments toward in-
stitutional reforms, stability, privatization and development. The World 
Bank’s role in this regard has also been prominent. Moreover, the EU’s in-
fluences to induce the Western Balkans to liberalize their trade and move 
toward greater regional cooperation occupies center stage in the goals of 
SAAs. Finally, an improvement in stability conditions in the Western Bal-
kans contributed toward doubling the amount of foreign direct investments to 
the area between 1998 and 2002. 
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TABLE 3 
International assistance to the Western Balkans 
2001, 2002 
 
 
Source: Joint Office of EC-World Bank, European Commission 
 
€ million 2001 2002 
European Union 1,331 1,280 
EC 784 783 
EU Member States 547 497 
Other Bilateral Do-
nors 
574 532 
IFIs including EIB 1395 1665 
TOTAL 3,300 3,447 
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TABLE 4 
Western Balkans: Inflows of foreign direct investments 
(in € million) 
 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Albania 40 48 155 228 167 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
89 85 163 145 259 
Croatia 746 1327 1169 1529 1171 
Former Republic 
of Yugoslavia 
100 105 27 184 570 
Former Republic 
of Yugosla-
via/Kosovo 
  0 5 10 
Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Mace-
donia 
150 23 190 498 76 
TOTAL 1125 1588 1704 2589 2253 
 
Source: IBRD Report 
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